BRAHMAPUTRA: A RIVER OF CONFLICT TAKES A STEP BACK

12 Janaury, Kathmandu .The Brahmaputra River serves as a vital resource for over 130 million individuals across China, India, and Bangladesh, yet it remains a source of ongoing tension. Unlike other regional river basins, the three countries sharing its waters have failed to establish a water-sharing agreement. The construction of dams by China and India upstream is frequently perceived as a threat by the downstream nations, particularly Bangladesh and even parts of India. Instances of low-level conflict have occasionally escalated, such as in 2000 when a landslide in Tibet resulted in a flood that claimed the lives of 30 Indian citizens. Concerns about a potential "water war" over dwindling resources have been heightened by the effects of climate change. Consequently, the river has transformed into a challenge to be navigated rather than a catalyst for regional collaboration.

The most recent escalation among the three nations was triggered by new policy directives from China, which proposed hydropower development along the section of the Brahmaputra nearest to India. While Chinese diplomats attempted to downplay the implications of this decision, Indian officials expressed their apprehensions, with some speculating about reciprocal dam constructions. As the lowest riparian state, Bangladesh may find itself caught in the disputes between its more dominant upstream neighbors; however, its strong economic ties with China suggest it is unlikely to side with New Delhi in pressuring Beijing. These challenges highlight the urgent need for confidence-building measures among the three nations. Leaders should consider taking incremental steps in the short term to prevent further escalation of tensions in the future.

A More Ambitious Chinese Initiative

The recent escalation of tensions between China and India can be traced back to the language used in the Chinese government's outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan, released in November. This document delineates national development objectives for the period from 2021 to 2025 and expresses an intention to "implement … the downstream hydropower development of the Yarlung Zangbo river." The Yarlung is the designation given by Beijing to the initial 2,840 kilometers of the river as it traverses Tibet, before it crosses the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control and is referred to as the Brahmaputra. This section of the river flows through a disputed region that India claims as Arunachal Pradesh, while China asserts it as part of southern Tibet. Subsequently, the river continues for an additional 1,856 kilometers through India and Bangladesh before discharging into the Bay of Bengal.

The significance of this language lies in its indication of a strategic objective to shift the focus of Chinese hydropower development closer to Indian borders. For over a decade, leaders within China's hydropower sector have proposed the construction of large-scale dams—potentially exceeding the capacity of the 22,500-megawatt Three Gorges Dam—in the "great bend." This particular segment of the river, which is nearest to India, features a two-kilometer drop over a distance of 50 kilometers, making it theoretically suitable for electricity generation, despite facing hydrological challenges, including its location in a seismically active region.

Previous five-year plans did not support these proposals and only made ambiguous references to the development of hydropower resources in "southwestern China." In the mid-2010s, Chinese authorities sanctioned a series of four small dams along the middle section of the Yarlung River, of which two are currently operational while the others are still under construction. The decision to refrain from endorsing megaprojects in the "great bend" was influenced by various factors, including environmental and feasibility issues, concerns about provoking India, and a limited economic necessity for additional power generation capacity, even within the renewable energy sector. In fact, Beijing has halted other renewable initiatives in western China due to an oversupply of capacity.

The policy change in November signifies a triumph for the hydropower sector, which has collaborated with Tibetan authorities to advocate for further dam construction as a means to generate revenue for Tibet, support China’s clean energy objectives, and promote local employment opportunities. The 14th Five-Year Plan particularly benefited the large state-owned enterprise PowerChina, which established a "strategic cooperation agreement" with Tibet in October. Chinese government officials may have endorsed this partnership as a strategy to bolster the struggling hydropower industry, which is contending with the rise of more cost-effective renewable energy alternatives, such as solar and wind power, and diminishing prospects for mega-dam projects in other regions of China.

PowerChina's marketing strategy for downstream dam construction has involved associating new initiatives with a "national security" rationale aimed at safeguarding domestic water resources. Chinese hydrological engineers have explored various proposals to utilize Tibet's abundant water resources to alleviate the water scarcity in northern China; however, these proposals have been dismissed as either unnecessary or impractical. In early 2020, Premier Li Keqiang emphasized the need to consider a hypothetical "western route" for the long-standing South-to-North Water Diversion project. The endorsement of construction in regions often linked to future diversion projects in the 14th Five-Year Plan indicates that the hydropower sector may have successfully persuaded skeptical officials of the viability of such initiatives.

These discussions have heightened Indian analysts' concerns that Beijing's ultimate objective is to divert the Yarlung River, not only to enhance irrigation within China but also to exert influence over New Delhi by controlling the river's flow—similar to China's actions in restricting water flow along the Mekong River to downstream Southeast Asian nations. Historically, China has attempted to alleviate India's apprehensions by asserting that dams on the Yarlung are merely "run of the river" projects that do not have the capacity to store or divert water. Following the recent announcement, Chinese diplomats once again sought to reassure India that the construction would not threaten downstream countries. Even if a new dam could redirect water, its strategic significance may be limited, as the majority of the Brahmaputra's flow originates from rainfall along tributaries on the Indian side of the border, unlike the Mekong, which predominantly originates in China.

China's hydrological conditions may limit its capacity to pose a threat to India; however, the inclusion of project implementation in the Five-Year Plan, particularly in regions that could provoke concern in New Delhi, indicates that Indian sensitivities rank low on China's list of priorities. This observation should not be unexpected for international analysts. Recent years have seen China enhance its military presence and develop infrastructure in contested Himalayan territories, alongside employing lethal force during border confrontations with Indian forces in 2020. These actions highlight Beijing's readiness to engage in risky behavior in its relationship with India to achieve its broader objectives.

India's Cautious Stance

Despite reassurances from China, the recent reports regarding plans to construct additional dams near the Line of Actual Control have reignited concerns in India. Indian media and analysts have underscored the potential risks associated with such dams, including the possibility of diverting water to other regions in China, creating water storage that could render it inaccessible to India during the dry season, or the sudden release of water during monsoon periods, which could result in flash flooding.

These apprehensions have long influenced the Indian perspective on the Brahmaputra River, even as both nations engage in discussions regarding their shared waterways. The ongoing issues of territorial disputes along the river, a lack of mutual trust, and intermittent border clashes in India's northeastern region have exacerbated tensions surrounding riparian relations. Following the latest concerning developments regarding China's dam initiatives, Ministry of External Affairs Spokesperson Anurag Srivastava issued a measured statement on December 3. He noted that India is "carefully" monitoring the situation and emphasized that, as a lower riparian state with significant established rights to the waters of trans-border rivers, India has consistently communicated its views and concerns to Chinese officials.

Indian officials have indicated a willingness to adopt more proactive strategies, which may include the construction of a domestic dam to address the potential repercussions of a new Chinese dam. Teerath Singh Mehra, the commissioner in India’s Ministry of Water Resources and representative to the India-China Expert-Level Mechanism on Trans-border Rivers, has been quoted by Reuters stating that the proposal for a new Indian dam with a capacity of 10,000 megawatts is currently being evaluated at the highest levels of government. However, India's history of dam construction has been inconsistent, often hindered by significant delays due to technical difficulties and local opposition, which is prevalent within the Indian federal framework. Additionally, it remains uncertain how a new dam would mitigate the challenges posed by a Chinese mega-dam in the "great bend" region, or even where such a structure would be situated.

At the same time, Indian officials have recognized that a substantial portion of the Brahmaputra's flow is derived from rainfall on the Indian side, which lessens concerns regarding potential reductions in water from Tibet that could result from any diversion initiatives. While Chinese proposals for a new dam, purportedly for national security purposes, may raise alarms in India regarding China's transparency and intentions, the underlying reality is that China is unlikely to construct a dam that alters the fact that a significant source of the Brahmaputra's water lies within Indian territory. Consequently, this latest dispute exemplifies the deep-seated mistrust between the two nations, as well as the dynamic nature of democratic discourse involving the government, media, and public.

The Indian government's cautious approach to China's announced intentions to construct a significant dam highlights its focus on national security, particularly in contrast to a conventional run-of-the-river dam that would not alter water flow or storage. This response is particularly notable given the heightened tensions between the two nations regarding border disputes in the northeast. While river-related matters have only recently emerged in the Sino-Indian dialogue, they seem to be evolving into another point of conflict rather than fostering collaboration.

Bangladesh's Downstream Challenges and Aspirations

As the lowest riparian nation along the Brahmaputra River, Bangladesh stands to face significant repercussions from dam constructions initiated by China and India. Following recent reports regarding a potential dam project by China, a Bangladeshi environmentalist raised alarms about the downstream effects on water flow. In our 2018 publication addressing the politics surrounding the Brahmaputra, we highlighted the concerns of Bangladeshi scientists who are investigating the implications of sedimentation resulting from upstream activities. The extent to which India will collaborate with Bangladesh in addressing these issues remains uncertain. A further complication in this coordination is another proposed project on the Brahmaputra, which is situated within Bangladesh itself. Specifically, PowerChina, the same Chinese organization previously mentioned, has extended an offer to Bangladesh for an engineering initiative aimed at embanking the Teesta River, a tributary of the Brahmaputra that flows into Bangladesh from India. This river has been a contentious point in Bangladeshi-Indian relations. In 2011, a water-sharing agreement was on the verge of completion, but then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was unable to garner domestic backing. Prime Minister Narendra Modi committed to advancing the issue, yet no tangible progress has been observed during either his first or current term. During the dry season, which spans approximately from November to May, Bangladesh experiences a shortage of water from the Teesta, particularly impacting rice farmers. Researchers link the increasing food insecurity in Bangladesh to the water resources of the Teesta, which are controlled by India through the Gazaldoba barrage. The inability to finalize this agreement nearly a decade later underscores the stagnation in addressing water-related challenges between India and Bangladesh.

China's recent hydropower project on the Teesta River seems to stem from a memorandum of understanding established in 2016 between the Bangladesh Water Development Board and PowerChina. By September 2020, Dhaka was evaluating the terms of Beijing's proposal while simultaneously seeking a $983 million loan from China for the initiative. This indicates Bangladesh's strong interest in addressing the persistent challenge of ensuring adequate water flow in the Teesta River throughout both dry and wet seasons. This collaboration is part of a broader investment strategy, with China committing approximately $25 billion to Bangladesh under the Belt and Road Initiative, making China the leading source of imports for the country.

As the middle riparian state, India may have valid concerns regarding China's activities in the Brahmaputra basin, both upstream in Tibet and downstream in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, Dhaka has been waiting nearly a decade for a water-sharing agreement with India regarding the Teesta, with little progress made. If these recent developments prompt India to re-engage on water-sharing discussions with Bangladesh and potentially finalize an agreement for the Teesta, then China's bilateral engagement with Dhaka might not be detrimental for the southernmost riparian. However, as of early December 2020, New Delhi has not indicated any intention to adopt a renewed diplomatic strategy.

Small Steps and a Broader Perspective

The intersection of dam construction with border conflicts and a deficit of political trust exemplifies the challenges that international observers anticipate will intensify resource competition in developing areas. The recent Global Trends 2035 report from the U.S. National Intelligence Council indicates that such situations will necessitate the adaptation of governance frameworks to alleviate tensions in river basins like the Brahmaputra, Mekong, Nile, Amu Darya, Jordan, and Indus.

However, the management of the Brahmaputra is significantly lacking in institutional support compared to other river basins. This deficiency is partly due to the river traversing disputed territories, resulting in the absence of a multilateral water-sharing agreement among China, India, and Bangladesh. Current bilateral cooperation is restricted to occasional expert meetings and agreements on hydrological data sharing, which have proven unreliable; for instance, in 2017, China withheld crucial data from India during the Doklam crisis. China's unilateral actions to develop hydropower in this sensitive area further complicate the prospects for enhanced collaboration. While India has refrained from immediate retaliation, concerns about potential reciprocal actions are troubling for Bangladesh, which perceives itself as a pawn in the strategic games of larger powers. Additionally, the growing cooperation between China and Bangladesh diminishes the likelihood that the two downstream nations can effectively coordinate to urge China to reconsider its development plans.

The capacity of the three nations to navigate a resource-driven rise in tensions fundamentally hinges on the leadership's decisions to refrain from implementing policies that could provoke one another. Such decisions are more probable when there is consistent communication among the three. In the immediate term, reestablishing dialogue between scientists and policymakers from these countries could alleviate some of the existing tensions. This approach could address Indian apprehensions regarding potential Chinese diversion strategies and inadequate dam construction, which could lead to humanitarian disasters reminiscent of the 2000 Tibetan landslide. Although challenging, it would be beneficial for Beijing to grant Indian officials and hydrological experts ongoing access to governmental plans and construction sites.

In the long term, the involved parties should aim to establish a more ambitious objective: the creation of a Brahmaputra Basin Commission. This commission would not need to be contingent upon resolving territorial disputes or require a significant level of pre-existing trust among the riparian states. It could provide a platform for high-level officials to express concerns while also fostering collaboration in areas of mutual interest, such as data sharing, search and rescue operations, flood management, and best practices in dam construction. Additionally, it would enable Beijing to showcase its leadership in regional governance and enhance overall relations with New Delhi. Recognizing these advantages, Chinese scholars have advocated for a cooperative model similar to the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, established in 2016 to formalize China's engagement with its Southeast Asian neighbors. This framework could serve as a valuable initial step toward the long-term goal of enhancing institutional collaboration.